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NOTES
TAX TREATMENT OF LOSSES INCURRED ON THE SALE OR
ABANDONMENT OF PURCHASED GOODWILL*
WHEN a taxpayer purchases a going concern whose earnings, because of
public favor toward the concern or its products, exceed the normal rate of
return for similar enterprises, that part of the purchase price attributable to
such unusual earning power must be capitalized as "goodwill."' Courts deny
*Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
1. Under the classical view of the free market, customers purchase only on the basis
of quality and price. CHANDLER, A PREFACE To ECONOMICS 41 (1946). In p-actice, how-
ever, patronage often results from friendships, reputation for quality, impressive sur-
roundings, attractive packaging, extra services, or even sheer habit. 1 FAitCHILV, FUR-
NISS & BUCK, ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS 289-92 (5th ed. 1948); WAUGH, PmiNCIPLEs O'
ECONOMICs 108-109 (1947) ; Foreman, Conflicting Theories of Goodwill, 22 COL. L. REv.
638, 638-9 (1922). Once the public is conditioned to react favorably toward, for example, a
trade-name, trade-mark, location or the firm name itself, the right to use such symbols
may acquire considerable value. Wright, Some Relations Incident to a Sale of Goodwill, 7
TENN. L. REv. 225, 235-6 (1929) ; see Ozone Co. v. U.S. Ozone Co. of Am., 62 F.2d
881, 885-6 (7th Cir. 1932). See also Wright, Tort Responsibility for thw Destruction of
Goodwill, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 298 (1929); Note, 1 STANFORD L. REV. 64 (1948). Thus the
fair value of an established concern, based on its expected earnings, often exceeds sub-
stantially the reasonable value of a similar enterprise starting anew with the same tangible
assets and with such intangibles as patents and copyrights. YANG, GOODWILL AND OTHER
INTANGIBLES 94-6 (1927); 1 FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 308-09 (1937). Even a
firm operating at a loss may possess valuable goodwill if a similar enterprise starting
anew would suffer even greater losses. Dick & Bros. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 505,
510-11 (1929); Pfleghar Hardware Co., 11 B.T.A. 361, 363 (1928), re,'d, 30 F.2d 614
(2d Cir. 1929); MILES, THE TREATMENT OF GOODWILL IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIN
23 (NEBRASKA STUDIES IN BUSINESS No. 37, 1935); MONTGOME Y, AUDITING Tutony
AND PRACTICE 280 (6th ed. 1940). This "excess" of earnings may be due to harmonious
labor relations (industrial goodwill) and established lines of credit (financial goodwill),
as well as to customer favor (consumer goodwill). See PATON, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING
398-400 (1947) ; YANG, op. cit. supra, at c. 3. For the variety of existing definitions of
goodwill, see 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MAUS 22-8 (2d ed. 1950);
10A MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.36 (1948) ; Wright, The Nature
and Basis of Legal Goodwill, 24 ILL. L. REv. 20 (1929); Foreman, supra; Metropolitan
Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1892); White Tower System v. White
Castle System, 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937).
The most widely employed method of valuing goodwill is to assume that tangible
assets earn a "normal" rate of return and that the capitalization of all "excess earnings"
determines the worth of a concern's goodwill. See A.R.M. 68, 3 Cum. BuLa. 43 (1920);
10A METENs, op. cit. supra, §§ 59.37-59.44; MILErS, op. cit. sipra, at 13-30; Schwartz,
Goodwill in the Tax Law: A Correlation, 8 TAX L. Rzv. 96, 97 (1952) ; Woll:stein, Good.
will in Federal Income Taxation, 24 TAxES 1158 (1946). As a result, accountants tend to
equate goodwill with "excess earnings." PATON, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 849 (1945),
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amortization deductions for such purchased goodwill on the theory that al-
though goodwill may fluctuate in value, it is never entirely lost so long as
the firm continues to operate.2 As a capital asset,3 however, goodwill with
a cost basis may reduce taxable income by providing a deductible loss 4 when
disposed of in a "closed and completed transaction." But since goodwiU is
not specific property and courts regard it as inextricably interwoven with
YANG, op. cit. supra, at cc. 5, 6. See also GRAHAM & KATz, ACcOU.TImG m- LAw, PaAc-
TICE 277 (2d ed. 1938); Walker, Accountants' Present Concept of GopdwilU Depends fqf'n
Unusnal Eanzing Power. 91 J. AccoUNTANC 100, 102 (1951). But excess earnings may
result from patents or monopoly power, factors excluded from the definition of geodwill
adopted by many courts and used in this Note. Consolidated Gas Co. v. City of New York,
157 Fed. 849, 872 (2d Cir. 1907) (public utility monopoly not goodwill) ; Ruud Mfg. Co.,
15 B.T.A. 819, 823 (1929), aff'd. 45 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1930) (value of patents excluded
from goodwill). See Amns, op. cit. szpra, at 13-30; Schwartz, supra, at 103.
Firms may pay sizable sums to acquire what they consider to he go.Awill. In 1947
the Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company purchased the Lustre-Creme Corporation, includ-
ing in the purchase price $3,750,000 for goodwill. Gillette Safety Razor Company paid
$15,955,970 for goodwill when it acquired the Auto-Strop Company in 1930, and more
recently paid $8,000,000 for the goodwill of the Toni Company. R-sr_.fncH DE3T Anma-
cAN I sTITrT op AccouNTANTs, ACCOUNING Tamms Am TEcmN urs 52-3 (1950).
These expenditures must be capitalized. Arthur P. Williams, 24 B.T.A. 1070 (1931);
Dime Bank of Lansford, Pa., 20 B.T.A. 250 (1930); see also Hillside Dairy Co., 3
T.C.Al. 174 (1944) ; A. Al. Oliver, 1 T.C.M. 8, 11 (1942).
2. "[G]oodwill, in any practical sense, has no terminable life; but, rather, it con-
tinues in existence just so long as the business continues, and its value fluctuates in direct
relationship with the annual variations in the profits of the business with which it is
associated." Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 1941). See
also Red Wing Malting Co. v. WVillcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (Sl Cir. 1926), cert. deierd, 213 U.S.
763 (1926); Buckeye Producing Co., 11 B.T.A. 96 (1928). U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23
(1)-3 (1943), permits a depreciation allowance for intangibles of limited life, and for those
of indefinite life upon a showing that any remaining usefulness will cease within an ascer-
tainable period. However, "goodwill" is specifically denied depreciation. See, e.g., X-
Pando Corp., 7 T.C. 48, 54 (1946); Bill Bros. Memorial Corp., 7 B.T.A. 1182, 11I5
(1927), appeal dismissed, 41 F.2d 98-8 (10th Cir. 1930). For the origin of the no-depre-
ciation rule, an interesting illustration of judicial gymnastics, see 4 Munrz:s, Low o
FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 23.119 (1942). See also Holzman, Tar Classics, 29 T.i:Es
231 (1951) ; Mitxs, THR TREATMENTn oF GooDwML Im FzRAYL Ix:comn TA.-ATioN. 44-5
(N RAszA STUDIES IN Busmss No. 37, 1935); Editorial, 49 J. AcC uv c::Tv,V 161
(1930).
3. Ensley Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 154 F2d 96S, 969 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 732 (1946); Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949); Hillside Dairy
Co., 3 T.C.M. 174, 175 (1944). See Note, 50 Mce. L Rrv. 953 (1952).
4. Brewer v. Orr, 19 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1927). Mere fluctuations in the value of an
asset cannot produce taxable gain or loss. United States v. White Dental Co., 274 U.S.
398, 401 (1927).
5. "In general losses for which an amount may be deducted from gross income must
be evidenced by dosed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, bona fide
and actually sustained during the taxable period for which allowed." U.S. Treas. Reg.
111, §29.23(e)-l (1943). See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.111-1 (1943).
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the going concern, goodwill cannot be separated from the economic activities
to which it is incident.0 Hence, there can be no "closed transaction" leading
to a deductible goodwill loss until the underlying "business" is terminated
or sold.7
Whether a taxpayer may realize goodwill losses when he parts with less
than his total enterprise presents a conceptual dilemma. Courts traditionally
have considered goodwill an "indivisible" asset as well as inseparable from
the underlying "business." As a result, when companies discarded their
principal activity but continued other operations-as brewers and distillers
did during national prohibition-courts reasoned that there had been no
"closed transaction" for purposes of recognizing goodwill losses.0 On the
other hand, common sense indicates that goodwill may attach to particular
aspects of a concern, such as a product, special services, or the firm name,
rather than to the bare legal entity through which operations are carried on.10
The Commissioner and courts admit that goodwill is divisible, by permitting
the realization of losses on purchased goodwill when part of the total enter-
prise is sold, even though the selling firm retains its physical assets or
engages in some other form of trade.11 And in Metropolitan Laundry
6. See Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893) ;
Dodge Bros. Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 1941). See also U.S. Treas.
Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-10 (1943). However, goodwill may be sold with an underlying
"business" which possesses no tangible assets, Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385, 390
(1925), or which is not yet in actual operation, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 269 Fed. 796, 806-07 (D. Del. 1920).
7. "A loss is sustained . . .only when it is a realized loss and is evidenced by a
completed and closed transaction.... There could be no loss in respect of the good will
until the business is terminated by sale or other disposition... ." Morand Bros., 8 B.T.A.
1262, 1266 (1927) ; followed in Buckeye Producing Co., 11 B.T.A. 96 (1928) (no "closed
and completed transaction" even though taxpayer is operating under a different name
and selling a new product to a new clientele).
8. Dodge Bros. Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 1941) ; Morand
Bros., 8 B.T.A. 1262, 1267 (1927). See also Garneau Co., 8 B.T.A. 1041, 1044 (1927).
9. E.g., Dick & Bros. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 505 (1929); F. C. Renzie-
hausen, 8 B.T.A. 87 (1927), aff'd, 280 U.S. 387 (1930). But see Moon Journal Pub. Co,,
13 B.T.A. 1379, 1382 (1928) ; Multnomah Theatres Corp., 2 B.TA.M. 370, 371 (1933).
10. See Wright, Some Relations Incident to a Sale of Goodwill, 7 TEN. L. Rav.
225, 233-6 (1929); Wright, The Nature and Basis of Legal Goodwill, 24 I. L. REV.
20, 31-2 and nn.61-5 (1929); see also Grace Bros. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170, 176
(9th Cir. 1949).
11. "Gain or loss from a sale of good will results only when the business, or part
of it, to which the good will attaches is sold, in which case the gain or loss-will be deter-
mined by comparing the sale price with the cost or other basis of the assets, including
good will." U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22 (a)-10 (1943)(emphasis added). Brewer v.
Orr, 19 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1927). Cf. Wawak Co. v. Kaiser, 90 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir.
1937); Devoy and Kuhn Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1335 (1931), re,'d
on an admission of error, 66 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Stratton Grocery Co., 8 B.T.A.
317 (1927) ; Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385 (1925).
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Company v. United States,2 a district court relied on the notion that goodwill
is divisible to justify, for the first time explicitly, the recognition of goodwill
losses upon the abandonment of an activity, distinct from other operations
of the firm.13
The taxpayer in Metropolitan operated a laundry plant and delivery ser-
vice in San Francisco and a similar enterprise, under a different name, in the
adjacent city of Oakland. Under pressure of condemnation, the company in
1943 leased its San Francisco plant to the Federal Government and ceased
deliveries on its San Francisco routes. Operations in Oakland continued un-
disturbed. The Government relinquished control of the San Francisco plant
in 1946, but the company unsuccessfully attempted to regain its civilian
business. Three years later the company permanently closed the plant and
discontinued the delivery service. Since the company had purchased the
laundry routes from other companies, it claimed that the abandonment of
the routes established an ordinary loss for 1943 and sued for a refund of
taxes paid.14
The district court sustained the taxpayer's contention over the defense
that there had not been a "closed transaction." The government argued that
Metropolitan's laundry routes formed an indivisible part of the total corporate
goodwill and were inseparable from the taxpayer's "business." Since the
company did not withdraw completely from laundry service, there was no
"closed transaction"; any loss should be considered only as a fluctuation in
the value of total corporate goodwill. But the court, admitting that good-
will is indivisible and inseparable, defined "business" more narrowly. Point-
ing out that the laundry "business" in San Francisco was entirely distinct
from operations in Oakland, the court found that the goodwill incident to
12. 100 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
13. One court allowed a taxpayer to recognize a goodwill loss on a partial abandon-
ment of a going concern. But the court did not use the term "goodwill," and instead
referred only to the "capital expenditure' lost on the abandonment of the "enterprise."
Reuben H. Donnelley, 26 B.T.A. 107, 114 (1932). Cf. United States v. Hardy, 74 F2d
841 (4th Cir. 1941) (abandonment of a sales agency); Paul Jones & Co. v. Lucas, 15
A.F.T.R. 681 (W.D. Ky. 1931) (trade-mark abandoned); Sheffield Dentifrice Co., 13
B.T.A. 877 (1928) (trade-mark abandoned while enterprise continued) ; David Schwartz
Co., I.T. 1505, 1-2 Cum Bum. 112 (1922) (development costs when branch plant aban-
doned) ; 5 Mmn s, TnE LAw or FEDz L Izzcoim TXAmTo § 28.19 (1942). See Lands-
berger v. McLaughin, 26 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 192). However, most cases prior to Ictro-
polita;; suggested that goodwill losses could be recognized only upon a sale of the enter-
prise to which the goodwill attached. See National Industrial Alcohol Co., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 38 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1930), aff'd, 282 U.S. 646 (1931). See also Red Wing Malting
Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1926); Garneau
Co., 8 B.T.A. 1041, 1044 (1927); I.T. 1995, 111-1 CuLm BLuL. 145 (1924); National
Chen. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. C1. 607, 612 (1929) (goodwill loss denied vhn
taxpayer abandons his entire enterprise); Schwartz, Good Will in the Tax Law: -1
Correlation, 8 TAx L. RFv. 96, 99 (1952).
14. See INT. Rnv. CoDE §23(f).
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the San Francisco routes had disappeared completely, thus entitling the com-
pany to recognize the loss of its cost basis.'5 Moreover, the opinion suggests
that even if the taxpayer had continued to run its San Francisco plant,
abandonment of the delivery service would have terminated the only "busi-
ness" to which the goodwill of route patrons could possibly attach.
Superficially, Metropolitan presents an appealing solution to the problem
of goodwill losses through partial abandonment. Purchased goodwill, incident
to a particular economic activity, may increase earnings only so long as the
taxpayer continues the activity. When a phase of the concern is abandoned,
any benefit from the incident goodwill is permanently lost. Recognition of
partial goodwill losses through abandonment thus seems fair-particularly
since taxpayers may now deduct losses on purchased goodwill if the losses
are incurred in a sale of part of the enterprise. Moreover, by requiring the
termination of at least some part of the going concern, Metropolitan preserves
an identifiable event to satisfy the "closed transaction" test. And since only
goodwill with a provable cost basis may lead to a deductible loss,10 oppor-
tunities for taxpayer abuse are minimized. Hence, partial abandonment loss
deductions do not impose an undue burden on either the Commissioner or
the courts.
The Metropolitan rationale, however, may induce unnecessary litigation
by encouraging taxpayer manipulation. The case does not limit the scope of
the "business" necessary to sustain a deduction to geographically separate
activities. The court's reasoning could apply with equal force to abandonment
of a product, location, or corporate name. Taxpayers may terminate relative-
ly insignificant portions of their going concerns at advantageous moments,
claiming a deductible loss on the ground that they abandoned a "business"
to which purchased goodwill (with a provable cost basis) had attached. More-
over, taxpayers might allocate excessive portions of purchased goodwill to
phases of the enterprise admittedly broad enough to sustain a loss deduction.
15. The court apparently thought that the company's maximum deductible loss was
the 1943 value of its routes. And the court found that the 1943 value of the routes equaled
or exceeded the initial cost. Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United States, 100 F. Supp.
803, 806 (N.D. Cal. 1951). Cf. Nat. Chem. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 607, 611
(1929). However, such alirmitation on the amount of the deductible loss clearly seems errone-
ous. Losses are normally computed by subtracting the amounts received upon disposition of
an asset from the asset's adjusted basis. The adjusted basis usually is cost less all obsoles-
cence, amortization, and depreciation actually "sustained" prior to March 1, 1913, less all ob-
solescence, amortization, and depreciation "allowable" under the Code after March 1,
1913. IxT. R-v. CoDE § 113. Since taxpayers are denied deduction for the obsolescence,
amortization, and depreciation of goodwill, the maximum deductible loss must be good-
will's initial cost (or its March 1, 1913, value if lower). For the computation of good-
will losses in sales cases, see U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-10 (1943).
16. This requirement is implicit in the Metropolitan case. See also Brewer v. Orr,
19 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1927). And see U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-10 (1943). How-
ever, the March 1, 1913, value of goodwill may be used to reduce the gain on the sale of
goodwill. See INT. Ray. CoDE § 113(a) (14).
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Although courts doubtlessly would see through most, if not all, of these
maneuvers, taxpayers nevertheless may be tempted to seek unwarranted aban-
donment losses. Of course, the same problems of "business" scope and a
realistic allocation now exist in partial sales. Limited only by the need to find
a willing buyer, taxpayers may sell relatively minor portions of the concern
in an effort to realize goodwill losses.' 7 And an unrealistic allocation of good-
will's cost basis may precede the sale.' 8 However, with tax avoidance as the
goal, abandonment might well be more attractive than a sale; abandonment
losses are deductible from ordinary income while goodwill losses upon a sale
fall into the capital loss category.1
The availability of deductions for piecemeal abandonment losses might even
prove to be a boomerang to taxpayers and further invite litigation. To bar
claims for goodwill losses on partial sales or partial abandonment, the Com-
missioner could argue that part or all of the taxpayer's total good-ill had been
attached to a phase of his enterprise-a "business"--previously abandoned. -3
Thus the cautious taxpayer may claim goodwill loss deductions prematurely
because he is terminating a facet of his enterprise which the Commissioner
conceivably might label a "business" at a later date. Even if the Commis-
sioner's argument fails, the taxpayer who abandons a "business" may be un-
able to prove the cost of that part of his total goodwill which is incident to
it and thus be denied a deduction because of no provable basis.21 And if the
taxpayer cannot prove a cost basis for the lost goodwill, he may in later years
be unable to show the cost of the goodwill which had remained. As a result,
17. See Grace Bros. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949) ; William M. Vailes,
25 B.T.A. 278 (1932). Cf. Acme, Palers & De Mocy Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 21 F2d
492 (N.D. Ohio 1927), aff'd, 30 F2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1928).
18. See Fraser v. Nauts, 8 F2d 105 (N.D. Ohio 1925).
19. "The term... capital loss .. . means loss from the sale or exchangc of a capital
asset.. . ." INT. Ray CODE §§ 117(a) (3), 117(a) (5) (emphasis added). "The limitations
provided in section 117 with respect to the sale or exchange of capital assets have no
application to losses due to the discarding of capital assets." U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 2923
(e)-3 (1945) (emphasis added) (regulation applicable to individuals). This provisi.n iz
made applicable to corporations by U.S. Treas. Reg. § 2923(f)-I (1943). The loss in the
instant case was treated as an ordinary loss. Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United Statez,
100 F. Supp. 803, 804-05 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
20. The statute of limitations may bar a reopening of the return for the earlier year.
See IzzT. REv. CoDn § 1636. For a general discussion of the problem of deductibility and
the statutory time limit, see Brown, Tuw TiVm for TaHing Deductions for Losses a;nd
Bad Debts for Icome Tax Purposes, 84 U. oF PA. L REV. 41 (1935).
21. Hall-Luhrs & Co., 6 B.T.A. 320 (1927). For the difficulty inherent in determining
the cost basis of goodwill, see Meurer Steel Barrel Co., 1 T.C.M. 721 (1943), aff'd, 144
F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1944), cerl. denied, 324 U.S. 160 (1945) ; Cherokee Motor Coach Co., 11
B.T.A.M. 365 (1942), aff'd, 135 F.2d 840 (1943) ; Sanderson v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 1(9
(2d Cir. 1930) ; Central Bank of Lincoln, Neb., 29 B.T.A. 719 (1934) ; Nice Ball Bearing
Co., 5 B.T.A. 484 (1926) ; Westfield & Fall River Lumber C., 4 B.T.A. 135 (1926).
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he could be foreclosed from his loss entirely.2 In partial sales cases, taxpayers
now encounter the problem of proving a realistic allocation. 23 But at least
taxpayers are not encouraged, in the absence of a doctrine permitting partial
abandonment losses, to claim goodwill losses prior to an actual sale.
Even if there is no doubt that a taxpayer has abandoned a "business" to
which goodwill with a provable cost basis had attached, the need to determine
the year of abandonment presents a litigious issue. Non-use of an asset is
insufficient to prove an abandonment: there must also be evidence that the
taxpayer intends the non-use to be permanent. 24 The Metropolitan case apt-
ly illustrates the problem of determining the existence of the requisite in-
tent. Although the laundry company, after leasing its plant, sold its trucks
and halted delivery service in 1943, it did not report a loss in its 1943 tax
return. The company made no effort to sell the routes; and, as soon as the
plant was returned, it attempted to regain its civilian business. Such acts
seem incompatible with an intent in 1943 to withdraw from the "business"
permanently. Probably not until 1949, when the corporation voluntarily ceased
its San Francisco operations, was there a clear intent to "abandon." Yet the
court assumed that the non-use of the San Francisco laundry "business" in
1943 also meant that an abandonment occurred in that year.
Although the intent requirement renders abandonment a nebulous "identi-
fiable event," neither non-use alone nor the actual deterioration of goodwill
is a satisfactory alternative. Non-use offers no assurance that the taxpayer
will not resume his activities after recognizing the goodwill loss.25 And to
ascertain when goodwill-consisting of public favor for a "business"-is actu-
ally lost would require findings even more difficult than a determination of
intent.20 In sales cases, courts normally have no difficulty deciding the ap-
propriate year for recognition of goodwill losses; the date of the sale marks
the year.2 7 Moreover, the seller's express or implied promise not to interfere
22. Courts may avoid this result by applying to goodwill the treatment now accorded
to securities purchased in a block. Vhen the purchaser is unable to allocate the cost
among the individual stocks and bonds acquired, no loss will be realized until all the
securities are disposed of or no gain until the total cost basis has been recovered. See,
e.g., Pierce v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 324 (Ct. Cl. 1943) ; Piper v. Commissioner, 5 T.C,
1104 (1945). See also 1 RAniIN & JoiaNsos, FEDERAL TAXATION § 33.02(4) (1951).
23. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
24. E.g., Boston Elevated Ry., 16 T.C. 1084 (1951); Ewald Iron Co., 37 B.T.A.
798, 799 (1938) ; Belridge Oil Co., 11 B.T.A. 127, 137 (1928). See 5 MERTENs, LAW op
FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 28.18 (1942).
25. See Chas. J. Michel Beverage Co., 10 B.T.A.M. 854, 856 (1941).
26. See Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 1941); Wash-
burn v. National Wallpaper Co., 81 Fed. 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1897); Manhattan Brewing Co.,
6 B.T.A. 952, 960-1 (1927).
27. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-10 (1943). See United States v. Huntington
Laboratories, 82 F.2d 356, 357 (7th Cir. 1936).
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with the buyer's enjoyment of the transferred benefits ensures that the seller
no longer will benefit from that goodvill.P
The harshness of present tam treatment of purchased goodwill may explain
the Metropolitan court's willingness to permit partial abandonment losses.
Advertising, promotional, and similar expenditures designed to create public
favor are generally deductible from ordinary income as business expenses.20
Yet outlays for ready-made goodwill cannot offset taxable income until some
subsequent disposition of the "business" to which all or part of the goodwill
is incident.3 0 However, the value of goodwill probably does not remain con-
stant. Competition, technological innovation, and changes in consumer prefer-
ences or habits may erase purchased goodwill.3 ' Thus, the ban against any
deductions for decrements in the value of purchased goodwill forces the tax-
28. The rule is not identical in all jurisdictions; yet it is generally accepted that
in the absence of an express covenant not to compete, the vendor may compete with his
vendee but may not impair the vendee's enjoyment of the transferred benefits. See, e.g.,
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F2d 975 (2d Cir. 1940); Dairymen's League Co-op
Ass'n v. Weckerle, 160 Misc. 866, 291 N.Y. Supp. 704 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
29. Three-in-One Oil Co. v. United States, 35 F2d 937 (Ct. CL 1929) (advertising);
F. E. Booth, 21 B.T.A. 148 (1930) (advertising); B. F. Boyer, 4 B.T.A. 189 (1926s
("public service" advertising); J. H. Gorsuch, 3 T.C.M. 1307 (1944) (entertainment of
customers); Liberty Insurance Bank, 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929) (miniature banks distri-
buted to customers) ; Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950) (gifts to supplicrs) , Popular
Dry Goods Co., 6 B.T.A. 78 (1927) (employee dances and picnics); R. S. LeSage, 6
T.C.M. 1263 (1947) (cost of Christmas party). See also Ihr. Rm. Corz §23(bb) (by a
1950 amendment: expenditures to increase newspaper circulation); I T. Rnv. Comn § 23-
(q) (charitable contributions). However, expenditures "solely for goodwillr are ncit deduc-
tible. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F-2d 814 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. derfed,
302 U.S. 722 (1937); Pevely Dairy Co., 1 B.T.A. 385 (1925); Benjamin Miggins, S
T.C.1. V2 (1949) ; A. M. Oliver, 1 T.C.M. 8, 11 (1942). The relative permanence of the
purchased benefits seems to be the criterion of whether a cost must be capitalized or may
be presently deducted. However, even this test cannot reconcile the cases.
30. Many authorities urge the adoption of goodwill amortization as a standard ac-
counting practice. LEA.E, CoamNacrv GoODvnmL 76-7, 93 (4th ed. 1948); PATou, AD-
vANcz AccouN=G 409 (1947); YANG, GoonwnL ANm OTHR INTANGUILES 1S9-201
(1927) ; Rolnik, The Probable Life of Goodwill as a Basis for Deprecation, 9 TAx MAG.
248 (1931). For the contrary position, see GRAHtar & KATrz, AccouN=G ,r Lw.'
Pascrc § 185, p. 279 (2d ed. 1938) ; 1 Fnnnv, Pnanlcwrs or AccomrrnG 317 (1937) ;
MoNTo~MEY, AUDrTIG TH yR Aim PaacrcE 498 (6th ed. 1940). For a summary of
the various accounting techniques of treating goodwill, see Preinreich, Goodwill in Ac-
countancy, 64 J. AccouNTANCY 28, 36-44 (1937) ; Kripke, A Case Study in the Relatin-
ship of Law and Accounting: Uniform Accounts 100.5 and 107, 57 HAv. L. Rrv. 433,
459-61 (1944). See also Gulf Power Co., 10 T.C. 852 (194 ).
31. Accountants are split on the question of whether purchased goodwill declines in
value when a business firm maintains its superior earning power. See references cited in
note 30 supra; May, Income Taxes and Intangibles: Two Significant Rescarch Bulletins,
79 J. AccoUNTANcY 124, 128 (1945); PAToN, AccouIAx,as' HAnmror 949-51 (1945).
And see Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 430, 446 (1,',93) ; Willimnaz
v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945) (suggests that goodwill is a deprecable
asset).
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payer to overstate his real income, as he would if he were denied deductions
for ordinary advertising costs or the depreciation of machinery.82 The hope
of an eventual loss deduction upon a partial sale offers small comfort to tax-
payers denied amortization deductions since evidentiary obstacles to proof of
a basis often preclude recognition of loss.33 And many taxpayers may tever
dispose of the totality of their enterprises through either sale or abandonment.
Two problems would confront the Commissioner initially if he were to
permit the amortization of purchased goodwill :84 the length of the amortiza-
tion period; and the appropriate treatment of large amounts of purchased
goodwill now on the books of many corporations. The amortization period
necessarily must be arbitrary since the actual life of goodwill defies accurate
measurement. 85 Perhaps the Commissioner would impose a minimum period,
32. See YANG, GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES 195, 206-08 (1927).
33. Dodge Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 1941). See note 21
supra. See also Acme, Palmers & De Mooy Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 21 F.2d 492 (N.D.
Ohio 1927), aff'd, 30 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1928).
34. This Note has defined goodwill as public favor towards an enterprise or its
products. See note 1 supra. If amortization of expenditures for "public favor" were per-
mitted, taxpayers necessarily would be able to deduct outlays for items which do not fall
within the "public favor" category, such as monopoly power or developmental costs. This
results from the impossibility of valuing "public favor" directly. Only capitalized earn-
ings in excess of a normal return on tangible assets can prove the existence of "public
favor." Yet the presence of excess earnings may be due to monopoly power rather than
"public favor." See note' 1 supra. Since there is no practical means of determining
the source of excess earnings, the amortization of expenditures for the intangible "good-
will" may well involve amortization of non-goodwill costs. The amortization of such costs
also seems justified. The life of intangibles other than goodwill is probably limited too.
LEAXBE, CommmcirAL GooDw_.L 25 (1948). And although the useful life of such intangibles
may be even more difficult to estimate than the life of "public favor," a write-off over an
arbitrary period seems more reasonable than a denial of any recognition for tax purposes
until the taxpayer terminates his enterprise. For a discussion of the problem, see YANG,
GooDwILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES c. 6 (1927) (favors the write-off of all intangibles
over the period utilized in capitalizing the excess earnings).
35. See references in note 24 upra. The Commissioner has never demanded absolute
precision in fixing the "useful life" of depreciable assets, and accepts estimates based on
the usual experience of property owners. See Bulletin "F" (Rev. Jan., 1942), 1 CCH 1953
FED. TAX REP. 1219.288. Courts have accepted arbitrary determinations of an asset's
useful life when there is no alternative yardstick. The cost of covenants not to compete
may be amortized over the legal, rather than useful, life of the vendor's promise. B, T.
Babbit, Inc., 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935); Carboloy Co., Inc., 2 T.C.M. 413 (1943); cf. Chris-
tensen Michine Co., 18 B.T.A. 251 (1929). Copyrights and patents are also depreciable
over their legal lives. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(1)-7 (1943). See also YANG,
GooDwILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLES 197 (1927). Although modern concrete and steel
buildings may last almost indefinitely, the Commissioner permits full depreciation over a
40 to 75 year period. See Bulletin "F' (Rev. Jan., 1942), 1 CCH 1953 FED. TAX REP.
1 219.299. The cost of an advertising campaign has been held deductible over a period esti-
mated to correspond with the effective life of the campaign's impact on the purchasing
public. E.g., Liberty Insurance Bank, 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929).
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possibly twenty years, for all enterprises. Such a period would prevent too
rapid write-offs in current high tax years and also provide a simple method
of handling the present accumulations of goodwill. If all such accumulations
were permitted amortization treatment, many large corporations could marked-
ly reduce their taxable income in the coming years by talcing large deduc-
tions.36 Besides producing generous tax savings, these deductions would dis-
tort actual income, since the goodwill initially purchased probably has dis-
appeared 37 and expenditures to develop goodwill are likely to have been
deducted as business expenses.38 Thus, taxpayers should not be allowed to
amortize goodwill which they purchased more than twenty years ago. Good-
wNrill purchased more recently might be accorded amortization treatment on
a pro rata basis until twenty years have elapsed from the date of purchase?
9
Goodwill remaining unamortized may then be carried on the taxpayer's books
and subjected to its present tax treatment.
36. The list of corporations with large accounts of purchased goodwill includes:
The Coca-Cola Co.--1,440,683 ("Formulae, Trademarks, Goodwill") ; Du Pont (I. E.)
de Nemours & Co.-$42,071,641 ("Goodwill, Patents, Trademarks, etc."); General Motors
Corp.-$63,214,330 ("Goodwill, Patents, etc."). MooDy's I:musTmALs 1624, 1303, 2255
(1952). See also last paragraph of note 1 supra.
37. See notes 30 and 31 supra.
38. See note 29 .sapra.
39. To illustrate: XYZ Corporation purchases a "business" on January 1, 1940,
$20,000 of the sales price being allocable to goodwill. Assuming that amortization will
commence on January 1, 1954, $14,000 (or 14/20's of the cost) would he denied amorti-
zation treatment. $1,000 (or 1/20 of the cost) could be amortized in 1954 and in each of
the following five years.
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